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ABSTRACT: This article examines the forms of interplay between the foreign policy of the 
Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the international standing recently gained by some of the 
country’s socio-political activists. These different forms of political argumentation are affected 
by Mauritania’s ‘Islamic republic’ label, which, adopted following independence in 1960, has 
been opportunistically used by the state and has become a double-edged sword when used to 
legitimate foreign and domestic policies. After discussing official expressions of foreign policy, 
the article moves on to examine the forms of social activism that have more recently questioned 
the country’s social landscape. The article concludes that Mauritanian foreign policy is in clear 
relation with a recent shift in the social agenda that questions Mauritania’s social structures, 
political apparatus and the state’s formal designation as an Islamic republic. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This article will discuss the current forms of interplay between Mauritania’s foreign 
policy practices and the international standing recently gained by some of the country’s 
socio-political activists. The local impact of these protest movements has led the 
country’s political leadership to openly debate with these agents and to externally 
justify, for example, the active presence of an abolitionist movement in the Mauritania. 
The article argues that questions of race and social stratification—which are clearly 
noticeable in the local arenas—permeate foreign policy structures and force the 
government to present arguments regarding these matters at different international 
levels. The current questioning of the country’s social status quo is now clearly 
inscribed in international forums, mainly through the innovative media uses made by 
different Mauritanian activists. 
                                                          
1 The research leading to this article has received funding from the European Research 
Council (ERC – 2016 – STG – 716467) 
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 The intricate debate explored in this article—and one that turns Mauritania into a 
particularly compelling case study—is also related to a critique of traditional Islamic 
scholarly traditions and their role in the definition of a stratified social milieu. Contrary 
to what has happened in other contexts more directly associated with the ‘Arab Spring’ 
(Diaw 2015), in Mauritania one notices not only an interrogation of the eminently 
political spheres, but a global movement concerned with the country’s overall social 
landscape, and with the uses of different Islamic readings which have supposedly 
helped stigmatize large sectors of Mauritanian’s Hassanophone populations. The 
complexity of these involvements should highlight the intertwined character of 
Mauritania’s foreign policy structures, as well as its effective debate with the activists 
presently questioning the social fabric of the country. 
 The article starts by outlining a global framework for the foreign policy 
structures that have defined Mauritania since its independence in 1960. It then debates 
the forms and uses associated with the ‘Islamic Republic’ label; and concludes with a 
presentation of activist movements and social actors who currently question both the 
country’s political leadership and its social design. 
 
MAURITANIA’S FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGIES (1960–2016) 
 
The foreign policy strategies associated with Mauritania are characterised by their 
diversity, if we consider the different—and often contradictory—policies which have 
been implemented since the country’s independence in 1960: the now-famous 
declaration by the country’s first president, Moktar Ould Daddah, that Mauritania would 
play the role of a trait d’union between the north and the south of the African continent; 
the country’s diverse post-colonial ties with France; its association with the Négritude 
movement; several ‘Marxist’ approaches (in connection with the Soviet Union, China, 
or Algiers); its proximity to Sudan’s Islamist project; and its familiarity with the 
Egyptian Pan-Arabism project. For more than half a century these ideological projects 
have at various points been associated with Mauritania’s foreign policy expressions 
(Diaw 1998). These different and sometimes oppositional approaches highlight the 
effort by the country’s first presidency to consolidate its identity, while simultaneously 
trying to define Mauritania as an effectively continental player, equidistant from the 
Maghreb and from Africa south of the Sahara. 
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When taking a closer look at contemporary events, the succession of regime-
change coups that from 2005 have marked Mauritania make it somewhat difficult to 
assess the country’s current foreign relations policy.2 One can nevertheless point to the 
development of ties with the European Union, with the People’s Republic of China, and 
with different Arab States from the Persian Gulf as indicators of the country’s policy 
direction. The protocols established with these different entities have been followed by 
the three presidents who have succeeded Maaouyia Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya (ousted in 
August 2005) in the presidency of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.3 
There has also been a strong bilateral rapport established with neighboring 
Morocco. This relationship has been marked by the development of economic ties 
between both countries and, more recently, by common security concerns. The first 
aspect is closely associated with the opening of an asphalt road connecting Nouakchott 
with the northern border town of Nouadhibou, facilitating the circulation of 
merchandise along the Atlantic coast from Tangiers (and Europe) in the north to Dakar 
in the south.4 Under President Abdel Aziz relations between Mauritania and Morocco 
have been somewhat strained, although there is no officially declared reason for this.5 
This tension is made evident by the fact that despite his frequent travels in Africa, the 
Moroccan king, Mohamed VI, has not yet landed in Nouakchott; additionally, the 
diplomatic post of ambassador to Rabat has remained empty since 2015. After a de 
                                                          
2 Chronology of Mauritania’s nine heads of state: Moktar Ould Daddah (1960–1978), Mustapha Ould 
Mohammed Salek (1978–1979), Ahmed Ould Bouceif (1979), Mahmoud Ould Ahmed Louly (1979–
1980), Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidallah (1980–1984), Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya (1984–2005), 
Ely Ould Mohamed Vall (2005–2007), Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi (2007–2008), and Mohamed Ould 
Abdel Aziz (2009–2017). 
3 Regarding foreign policy, one aspect stands out from the Ould Taya regime: the establishment of 
diplomatic ties with the state of Israel in 1999, after Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the second Gulf War. In 
this moment RIM became the third Arab country to do so (besides Egypt and Jordan). Israel’s embassy in 
Nouakchott was closed in March 2009, as a response to the Israel’s assault on Gaza in the winter of 
2008–2009. 
4 Special attention should also be paid to the role played by the social actors directly involved in the 
commercial operations established along this extended geography. The Oulad Bisbah qabila (‘tribe’)—
which the current Mauritanian president comes from—is historically identified with this region, 
circulating between Agadir in Morocco and Dakar in Senegal. This is a relevant fact to be taken into 
account while considering the more recent trading bonds developed by the kingdom of Morocco and the 
Islamic Republic of Mauritania. 
5 A more recent minor diplomatic incident has been described as further proof of this malaise: in the 
summer of 2016 Mauritania refused to grant work permits to twelve Moroccans working for the mobile 
phone company Mauritel. 
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facto very tense period following Mauritania’s independence,6 both countries had 
apparently established a peaceful relationship—one that is now being called into 
question by different actors.7 
 Mauritania’s foreign policy relationship with neighbouring Senegal is somewhat 
similar to its relationship with Morocco. During the period immediately following 
Mauritania’s independence, Senegal represented one of the country’s major partners at 
all levels (contrary to Morocco), but more recent developments led us to coincidentally 
portray a difficult, and many times strained, neighbourly relationship (culminating in 
the dramatic events that in 1989 nearly led both countries into war; see Pazzanita 1992: 
298–300). In the present status quo, Mauritania views Senegal as a highly significant 
trading partner, with a noteworthy population flow across the Mauritanian-Senegalese 
border. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the present regional turmoil—largely associated 
with the latent conflict in Mali, but also involving global actors and agendas—the 
Mauritanian regime has received strong support from the European Union and the 
United States, both in the form of military aid and financial partnership. When 
Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz took power through a military coup (August 2008), and was 
latter elected president of the country (August 2009), both the EU and the US strongly 
supported Aziz’s newly acquired role (he was for decades an important part of the 
country’s intelligence community). The EU and the US made clear, on different 
occasions, their appreciation for the role President Aziz played in the stabilization of the 
region, notably during the Malian conflict (2011–2013). Since 2011 Mauritania has in 
fact been seemingly immune to militant extremist attacks, and the French-led Operation 
                                                          
6 Problems between the two countries emerged from the moment that Mauritania obtained its 
independence from France (concerning the Western Sahara question, see also Serrano & Rodríguez-
Esteban, 2017: 48). Morocco did not accept this ruling, and peaceful bilateral relations between both 
countries were only established in 1969. In African arenas this problem became clear during the process 
leading to the creation of the Organization of African Union (Addis Ababa, 1963): Mauritania is one of 
the founding member states, but Morocco only became a full member four months later (19 September, 
1963), precisely because of Mauritania’s presence in the foundational meeting. The Alawite Kingdom 
would latter abandon this organization in 1984, this time because of the inclusion of the Saharawi Arab 
Democratic Republic as a member state. Morocco has more recently (2016) requested its re-adhesion to 
this organization, now renamed African Union. See also Correale and López Bargados 2017: 228–230. 
7 Another significant fact adding to this situation has to do with the sulfurous declarations of the leader of 
the Moroccan Istqlal party, Hamid Chabat, who, in December 2016, stated that his country’s borders 
extended from the Mediterranean sea to the River Senegal (http://www.middle-east-
online.com/english/?id=80608; accessed 02/03/2017). At present, border conflicts have also been noticed 
in northern Mauritania: https://ledesk.ma/enclair/guerguerat-10-cles-pour-comprendre-le-bras-de-fer-
avec-le-polisario/ ; https://telquel.ma/2016/06/29/maroc-mauritanie-querelle-voisinage_1504184 
(accessed 06/03/2017). Regarding cross-border tensions and their significance in North African countries’ 
foreign policies, see Fernández-Molina and Hernando de Larramendi, 2015: 249. 
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Serval seems to have achieved its goals of silencing open military actions in the 
country.8 
The US, in particular, has acknowledged Mauritania’s participation in the fight 
against radicalization (also known as CVE, ‘Countering Violent Extremism’), especially 
following an international summit on the subject in 2015, which Mauritania hosted. 
American officials have praised Mauritania’s longstanding tradition of ‘peaceful Islam’; 
according to Bisa Williams, US Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African 
Affairs, Mauritania is particularly ‘well equipped to respond to assaults on the practice 
of Islam and espouse messages of peace’. Williams also described the (mostly tentative) 
dialogue established between ‘moderate’ scholars and ‘radicalised’ prisoners in 
Nouakchott as a pioneering initiative, ‘offering an inspiring example to neighbouring 
countries like Mali and Niger’.9 
Working within the framework of the ‘Cotonou Agreement’ (the ACP-EC 
Partnership Agreement between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group 
of States; latest revision signed June 2010), the EU and Mauritania held a meeting on 9 
December, 2016 in Nouakchott, which concluded by reiterating the EU’s commitment 
with Ould Abdel Aziz’s govermnment and with the development programmes of his 
government (notably the ‘Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Prospérité 
Partagée’).10 The final joint statement by the officials present at this meeting highlights 
the merits of the Mauritanian president in areas of extreme importance for the EU, such 
as illegal immigration, the fight against terrorism, and the region’s overall political 
stability.11 
Another important aspect of Mauritania’s political geography involves the 
country’s relationships with the Arab world. These links are layered and complex, 
ranging from simple political partnerships to significant ideological and identity-related 
issues connecting this country on the Saharan edges with the cradle of Islamic 
civilization. There have also been migratory flows of some significance between the 
                                                          
8 The security operation in the Sahel region, still led by the French, is now entitled ‘Barkhane’ (since 
August 2014), and extends its geographical scope to Niger, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso. 
9 https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/08/23/debunking-mauritania%E2%80%99s-islamist-militancy-
mythology (accessed in 15/02/17). See also Otayek 2011. 
10 Regarding the EU’s direct participation in Mauritania, one might also point to the funding of border 
controls, roads, infrastructure, and renewable energy producing facilities, as well as the fisheries 
agreements currently in force; at an official level the EU’s High Commissioner Federica Mogherini as 
more recently (April 2017) reiterated the importance of a reinforced partnership between the EU and 
Africa (https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mauritania/25533/communication-conjointe-un-nouvel-
%C3%A9lan-pour-le-partenariat-afrique-ue_fr). 
11 See http://cridem.org/C_Info.php?article=691944 (accessed 20/02/2017). 
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two regions, signaling the social and economic value of this relationship (Ould Ahmed 
Salem 2007: 34). Contrarily to what has been signalled in other geographies, 
Mauritanian migration to the Gulf states has not led to a significant change in local 
religious learning and practice (Freire 2014). Nevertheless, such alterations have been 
identified in Mauritania, through the direct action of agents who have been working in 
the country (and the overall western Sahara region) at least since the late 1970s. 
Still regarding the Arab world, one important event should be pointed out in 
particular: from 25–27 June, 2016, President Ould Abdel Aziz hosted the 27th Summit 
of the Arab League in Nouakchott. The participants of this meeting released a 
concluding statement establishing their opposition to Israeli presence in Palestine; a 
desire for a rapid resolution of the Syrian conflict (with no mention made as to the 
future of the Assad regime); the hope that Iraqi forces will prevail in their combat 
operations against ISIS, as well as the necessity to maintain Iraq’s internationally 
recognised borders. This Sunni forum also made a statement against Iran’s interference 
in Middle Eastern affairs. However, the summit fell short of actually forming a unified 
Arab alliance that might effectively help to solve the Syrian or Iraqi conflicts. Of the 
twenty-two countries forming this assembly, the heads of state of only seven (Sudan, 
Somalia, Comoros, Yemen, Djibouti, Qatar, and Kuwait) travelled to Nouakchott; this 
could be considered as something of a failure of Abdel Aziz’s presidency, which could 
not attract high-level diplomatic representatives from many Arab countries.12 
                                                          
12The future of the presidency which currently leads Mauritania’s foreign policies is currently being 
questioned by opposition figures, who doubt that President Abdel Aziz will leave office, as 
constitutionally declared, in 2019. President Abdel Aziz has nevertheless repeated on several occasions 
that he will in fact leave office by the end of his second term. See 
http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/12/09/il-n-y-a-pas-d-effervescence-islamiste-en-




A SAHARAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
 
Mauritania’s foreign policy is also influenced by the fact that since the late 1950s it has 
officially been designated as an Islamic Republic. The use of this term places 
Mauritania alongside Pakistan (1956), Iran (1979), and more recently Afghanistan 
(1992), as the sole representatives of this kind of political structure. Of these countries, 
only Iran seems to have consolidated a structured approach to such a project 
(Mottahedeh 2008; Bayat 2013: 35–70), while the others—including Mauritania—have 
seemingly adopted this designation for mostly ideological reasons (Salomon 2016).13 
Nevertheless, the moniker gives Mauritania a particular status on the political map, and 
particularly in the Arab-Islamic forums. At a regional level, it signals a clear 
demarcation from neighbouring Morocco, Algeria, Mali, and Senegal—and also from 
the laical character of French colonial administration. Islam’s inscription in the 
country’s name declares Mauritania’s undeniable link with Islamic culture (and 
signalling at the same time a clear distinction from its ‘pagan’ neighbours), which 
should guarantee Mauritania a pivotal role in regional history as a protagonist in the 
expansion and protection of Islamic values. 
The large majority of the political actors behind Mauritania’s modern state 
project came from zwaya (‘religious’) social backgrounds in the Trarza region of 
southwestern Mauritania. The country’s first president, Moktar Ould Daddah (1960–
1978), was himself a product of a southwestern Mauritanian religious scholarship 
tradition (Stewart 1973; Cleaveland 1998)—and, of course, of colonial education as 
well. In Trarza (the Mauritanian region bordering the French colonial headquarters of St 
Louis du Senegal), colonial educational efforts were more clearly felt, leading social 
actors from this region to ascend to political leadership during the country’s founding 
period. This particular reading of the local context remains, at the present, a significant 
marker for the emergence and development of Mauritania’s statehood. 
Contrary to this view, Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem has argued that the true 
reasons for the naming of Mauritania as an Islamic Republic were ‘opportunistic’ in 
nature. According to this author, the Islamic label was chosen simply because it enabled 
the country to rapidly unify its multi-ethnic populations: Islam was used as an 
                                                          
13 Today the most visible narratives of identity (focusing mainly on the Hassanophone population) are 
those reflecting proximity with the Arabic Peninsula at the time of the Prophet (see Freire 2011: 58–59). 
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integrative and conciliatory element—probably the only one available at the time—that 
could hold together the fragile social equilibrium during the transition years from 
colony to state (1957–1960). A clear indication of this can be found in the laconic 
statement that Mauritania’s first president devotes to the topic in his lengthy 
autobiography: ‘On the 28th [November 1958], the Territorial Assembly was reunited 
for the first time in Nouakchott, and it unanimously opted to become a member state of 
the Franco-African Community, proclaiming the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF 
MAURITANIA (Ould Daddah 2012: 183; my translation). In this same text, Ould 
Daddah also points to Mauritania’s social diversity as one of the country’s relevant 
features: ‘Mauritania, whose national unity was far from effective’ (Ould Daddah 2012: 
182; my translation).14 
Even if the Islamic label could effectively work as a marker that was recognised 
by all Mauritanian citizens, its application as an effective state apparatus was not 
immediately clear from the start. The very limited development of eminently Islamic 
policies has led many observers to argue that this designation has no practical value, 
thus turning Mauritania merely into what Ould Ahmed Salem has called a ‘pseudo-
confessional’ state (2013: 53–60). 
However, there are some threads that might connect the ideological project of 
the ‘Islamic Republic’ characterization to actual political practices. For example, one 
could single out the adoption of a national currency (cutting ties with the West African 
common monetary policy), or Mauritania’s joining the Arab League in 1973. According 
to Pazzanita (1992: 282), the establishment of diplomatic ties with Morocco was pivotal 
in Mauritania’s acute policy switch from African to Arab partners and political allies. 
Additionally, in 1980, twenty years after the country’s independence, Arabic was 
formally declared as the nation’s official language (Taine-Cheikh 2007: 45–6). 
Some years latter, in 1984, President Ould Taya decided to combine the 
ministries of Culture and Islamic Affairs. For its head he chose the reputed Islamic 
scholar Mohamed Salem Ould Addoud (minister from 1989–1992; d. in 2007). This 
renowned personality is linked both with the traditional Maliki scholarship of 
southwestern Mauritania and with the new religious trends emanating, notably, from 
                                                          
14 Mauritanian populations comprise a large majority of Hassaniyya speakers (formed by the bidan, the 
name attributed to the populations of ‘noble/free’ status, and various other groups of tributary status, with 
a clear emphasis on the Haratin population, of slave descent), and different—if significant—Pullar, 
Soninké, and Wolof ethnic minorities. 
9 
 
Saudi Arabia.15 This act of delegation is probably the closest that one can get to the 
classic partition between the sultan and the ‘ulama (Islamic scholars) as leaders of an 
Islamic state, where religious officials distance themselves, or simply ignore, the more 
mundane aspects of governance, notably military affairs.16 
The political use—or pure and simple instrumentalisation—of Islam and Islamic 
culture has been made clear since the founding period of Mauritania as an independent 
state, with significant examples transversely occurring throughout all of the country’s 
presidencies. In 1985, during a dramatic period of social instability, the then-president 
Ould Taya declared that in Mauritania, ‘you can find people who try to create conflicts 
between black and white, but they don’t succeed because all of us are Moslem’ (cited in 
Pazzanita 1992: 294). 
The complexity of the Mauritanian Islamic Republic label makes it difficult to 
attach to well-known formulas of political science, following which one can give a 
‘primordialist’, ‘instrumentalist’, or ‘constructivist’ label to identity-related foreign 
policy practices (Cook-Huffman 2008: 25; Guillaume 2011: 34). The Islamic reference 
in Mauritania’s official title is evidently related to primordial ties with Islamic culture in 
the western Saharan region, but a close reading of political expressions since 
independence also provides evidence for both an instrumental and constructivist use of 
Islamic credentials by political actors (Marty 2002: 63–65). Mauritania’s ‘Islamic 
Republic’ label seems to have been used by different political agents in order to achieve 
opportunistic objectives, rather than utilised in a concerted effort to provide an Islamic-
based political administration to this Saharan country. 
 
SOCIAL ACTIVISM IN AN INTERNATIONALISED CONTEXT 
  
Resuming the argument made above regarding the use of the Islamic label for purposes 
of social cohesion, it is nonetheless surprising that more than fifty years after 
Mauritania’s independence this debate has again been placed in the socio-political 
agenda. President Abdel Aziz has recently initiated a campaign defending Mauritania’s 
absolute and unbreakable unity, in a response to a series of protests from diverse social 
                                                          
15 Presently his nephew, Mohamed Ould Hassan Ould Dedew, is probably the most respected Islamic 
scholar in the country, with a clear influence at a global level. Regarding Mauritania’s inclusion in the 
acknowledged global transits of Islamic theological debates, see Hill 2012 and Ould Mohamed Baba 
Moustapha 2014. 




spheres, notably from the abolitionist movement IRA-Mauritanie (led by the Biram 
Ould Dah Ould Abeid) and from a ‘blacksmith’ status group which has been publicly 
contesting their continued stigmatisation. Answering to these movements—which 
clearly have potential international repercussions—the official state response was 
anchored in a rhetorical return to the National Unity narrative.17 If present media uses 
(notably mass and social media) are generally known as ‘weapons of the weak’—for 
their low cost, rapidity, and wide diffusion—(Soares & LeBlanc 2015), one should not 
forget that these same ‘weapons’ are also being used by the state.18 
In Mauritania, this social unrest—which one might theoretically still associate 
with the aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring of the early 2010s (Fernández-Molina, 
2015; Ojeda García 2013)—in particular questions the purported appropriation of 
different written sources of Islamic scholarship, which, according to some, have been 
used in order to maintain the hierarchised social model known to the region (McDougall 
2010; Ould Ahmed Salem 2009). The activists questioning the social inequalities 
noticeable in Mauritania have openly declared that Islamic readings are, to a large 
extent, responsible for the perpetuation of social stratification policies. This was not at 
all the kind of argumentation used in the movements that occurred in Egypt or Tunis; in 
these cases, public demonstrations were eminently associated with the direct 
contestation of specific political leaderships. In the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, in 
contrast, public expression of dissatisfaction with the political spheres has turned into a 
wider discussion which calls into question the country’s entire social fabric as well as 
the reputedly incorrect uses made of Islamic texts by some of the region’s more 
prominent scholars. 
The example that best portrays this ongoing debate is the dramatic case 
involving Mohamed Cheikh Ould Mkhaitir, a condemned apostate currently on death 
row. In January 2014 this thirty-year-old published an online text that led to public 
outrage, with significant crowds demonstrating in different Mauritanian towns calling 
for his punishment, notably in Mkhaitir’s native Nouadhibou (northwestern Mauritania). 
                                                          
17 The urgency of the ‘national dialogue’ publicised by President Aziz more closely resembles a 
monologue, as the large majority of the political forces in the country have chosen not to engage in this 
presidential initiative. See, for example, the recent interview by Mauritania’s former president, Ely Ould 
Mohamed Vall, to the newspaper Le Monde: http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/10/26/le-regime-
mauritanien-a-mis-le-pays-dans-une-situation-deplorable_5020735_3212.html (accessed 05/03/17). 
18 We have recently witnessed the launching of different websites promoting this cause (see 
http://www.mp.mr), as well as a campaign across television, radio, and newspapers, guaranteeing the 
saturation of their message in Mauritania. 
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Mohamed Cheikh Ould Mkhaitir was swiftly imprisoned, and a court decision declared 
him guilty of apostasy—something absolutely unprecedented in Mauritania.  
The text in question—which was only available online for a few days—
commented on some actions of the prophet of Islam: Mkhaitir stated that the prophet 
Mohamed had been unfair when he chose not to punish his Qureishi relatives (who, as it 
is widely known, had on previous occasions questioned and affronted his authority), 
whereas he decided to do the opposite when dealing with the Bani Qurayzah (Jewish) 
tribe, after they had already decided to surrender during the ‘Battle of the Trench’. 
Mkhaitir additionally criticised the subsequent Quranic readings of the prophet’s actions 
made by different authors, and in particular the way these readings had been used for 
segregationist purposes in the western Saharan region. According to Mkhaitir, from the 
death of the prophet onwards the sacred text had been often put to unsound uses, 
altering its original principles. He argued that these biased interpretations of Islam’s 
sacred text were especially associated with the zwaya (‘religious’) status groups, which 
for centuries kept Mauritania’s Islamic traditions and were considered the legitimate 
interpreters of Islamic scholarship in the region—as well as being preponderant actors 
in Mauritanian political life (see above). According to Mkhaitir’s manifesto, this 
group’s use of scholarly works served to legitimise a hierarchised social order that was 
particularly cruel to his ‘oppressed brothers’, the muallemin (people of ‘blacksmith’ 
ancestry; one of the more clearly stigmatised Saharan populations).  
Why, exactly, did Mohamed Mkhaitir decide to engage in this doctrinal 
controversy, beyond confronting Mauritania’s social status quo? Why did he choose to 
speak out on the seventh-century massacre of the Jewish Bani Qurayzah in Medina, 
when popular imagination aggressively associates the muallemin status group precisely 
with a Jewish origin? Indeed, after Mkhaitir posted his arguments online, many in 
Nouakchott wondered if he was, in fact, Jewish; others suggested that his writing had 
simply been commissioned by Israel.  
In court, Mohamed Mkhaitir insisted that he was not an apostate and that his sole 
intention had been to call attention to an unfair use of religious knowledge in 
Mauritania. The country’s political leadership did not question the decision of the court 
to sentence Mkhaitir to death, and President Abdel Aziz has recently confirmed that 
Mkhaitir will be executed: ‘I’ve listened to the Mauritanians who protested against the 
writings of this blogger, and they were the ones demanding his condemnation to death’ 
12 
 
(my translation).19 More recently this court ruling has also been confirmed by a majority 
of the country’s Islamic scholars (in November 2016), who have declared capital 
punishment as the appropriate treatment for apostates, such as Mkhaitir.20 
In twenty-first-century Mauritania, Mohamed Mkhaitir developed an argument 
against the discriminatory treatment of a group associated with a tributary origin,21 and, 
for that purpose, he chose to debate prophet Mohamed’s role in a seventh-century 
dispute that took place in Medina. This oblique itinerary, covering more than a thousand 
years of history, illustrates the pervasive importance of Islamic debates in present-day 
Mauritania (confirmed by the popular outrage that the text triggered). Additionally, the 
international campaigns against the Mauritanian court’s decision point to the global 
reach of this event and to the connections of the Mauritanian Islamic spheres with the 
wider world.22 The Mauritanian president has repeatedly stated in interviews with 
international media organizations that the court’s decision in this case is legitimate and 
that it is the government’s duty to abide by it, as the political representatives of a de 
facto Islamic republic. One might point out that it has taken more than half a century for 
any local political entity to openly assume the Islamic character of the Mauritanian 
state, and the impetus to do so now has come from a case not only about the discussion 
of Quranic exegesis but also—and perhaps more importantly—the tradicional social 
structure of Mauritania’s Hassanophone populations. 
The much better known case of Biram Ould Dah Ould Abeid constitutes another 
example of the kind of debates around the ‘Islamic republic’ label in Mauritania—and 
of their international dimensions. In 2008 Biram became a decisive actor in 
Mauritania’s public arenas after founding the abolitionist movement IRA-Mauritanie 
                                                          
19When asked if Mkhaitir’s condemnation to death was a ruling imposed by ‘extremists’, President Aziz 
answered: ‘Non, il s’agit tout simplement d’une expression de certaines personnes attachées à leur 
religion, dans un pays musulman à 100%. Nous ne sommes pas extrémistes, nous pratiquons un islam 
modéré et tolérant’. See President Aziz’s interview with the newspaper Le Monde, 09/12/2016, 
http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/12/09/il-n-y-a-pas-d-effervescence-islamiste-en-
mauritanie_5046599_3212.html?xtmc=abdel_aziz&xtcr=1 (accessed 13/03/17).  
20 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mauritania-trial-idUSKBN1380P0?il=0 (accessed 07/12/2016). 
21 The Mauritanian president had previously tried to appease social tensions felt over the muallemin 
stigma when he appointed figures with a ‘blacksmith’ origin to crucial roles in the administration (notably 
the minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of the Gendarmerie Nationale), following the unparalleled 
public demonstrations that during 2013 had demanded the incorporation of muallemin figures in the state 
apparatus. 
22 Freedom Now (http://www.freedom-now.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Mkhaitir-Urgent-Action-to-
SR-11-28-2916.pdf); International Publishers Association 
(https://www.internationalpublishers.org/news/press-releases/460-ipa-appeals-for-mercy-for-mauritanian-
death-row-blogger); Human Rights Watch (https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/26/mauritania-blogger-




(Initiative pour la Résurgence du Mouvement Abolitionniste). His vehement 
interventions gained him significant prominence as the most active figure promoting the 
rights of the Mauritanian Haratin population (of slave descent). The fact that he ended 
up second in 2014 presidential election confirms his influence in Mauritania’s politics 
(even if he only obtained 9% of the ballots, against Mohamed Abdel Aziz’s 82%). 
After several short periods in jail (between 2010 and 2012), Biram and two of 
his collaborators (Brahim Bilal and Djiby Sow) were arrested and sentenced to two 
years’ imprisonment in November 2014, condemned for taking part in an unauthorised 
assembly, failing to comply with police orders, and resisting arrest during an anti-
slavery march in Nouakchott (Cervello, 2015). He served twenty months in jail and was 
released in May 2016.23 He is an important figure today not only for a large spectre of 
Mauritanian society, but also for the international community at large:24 in 2013 Biram 
was one of six world personalities awarded the Human Rights Prize by the United 
Nations,25 and when he was released from jail, the UN’s Secretary General issued a 
statement commending this gesture from Mauritanian authorities.26  
In December 2014 a resolution concerning Biram’s case was voted and approved 
in the European Parliament (‘Resolution on Mauritania, in particular the case of Biram 
Dah Abeid’, 2014/2999), calling on European authorities to “increase their efforts to 
address slavery in Mauritania, specifically by ensuring a clear and workable foreign 
affairs and human rights policy in line with the EU Strategic Framework on Human 
Rights and Democracy, and by promoting a human rights dimension as part of the EU 
Sahel Strategy, and in dialogues with the Mauritanian Government, including formal 
bilateral agreements”.27 This parlamentary Resolution was not formally answered by the 
European Comission. 
                                                          
23 According to the Amnesty International Annual Report, Biram had been arrested ‘after taking part in a 
peaceful protest’: https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/mauritania/report-mauritania/ (accessed 
24/03/2017). 
24 IRA-Mauritanie was heard in the European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights in December 
2015 (http://unpo.org/article/18765; accessed 20-05-2017).  
25http://www.ohchr.org/EN/newyork/Stories/Pages/HRPrizesawardedinNewYorkonHumanRightsDay.asp
x (consulted 28/11/2016); see also Biram’s interview with the newspaper Le Monde in 03/10/2016: 
http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/10/03/biram-dah-abeid-la-voix-des-esclaves-modernes-de-
mauritanie_5007366_3212.html (accessed 12/03/2017). 
26 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsId=53973#.WNk2HY5JlcA (accessed 28/03/2017). 
27 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B8-2014-
0382&language=EN (accessed 22/05/2017). I would like to thank the information provided on this 
subject by the office of Ana Gomes, member of European Parliament, and signatory of this resolution.   
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It’s probably because of this kind of international pressure that Biram, Brahim 
Bilal, and Djiby Sow—as well as other, lesser-known actors of the abolitionist cause—
have more recently seen their convictions reduced or have been released from prison.28 
The Mauritanian political sphere cannot ignore the presence of Biram as a 
decisive actor; indeed, he has recently announced his second candidacy for the 
country’s presidency (in the forthcoming 2019 election). He has also stated his 
opposition to some of the Islamic readings disseminated in the country, that, for him—
as it was for Mohamed Mkhaitir—serve to guarantee the perpetuation of genealogically 
based social stratification in Mauritania. For example, in April 2012, after Friday 
prayers, he promoted the burning of religious jurisprudential literature (notably the 
Abrégé de Khalil) outside a mosque located in a poor neighborhood in Nouakchott, 
declaring that this text, among others, was being used to sustain Mauritania’s blatant 
social iniquities. 
Mauritania’s pivotal role in the history of Islam, and especially its transmission 
in the western Saharan region and in West Africa, is today a well-known fact; much less 
known is the social milieu within which a scholarly tradition of Islamic knowledge was 
actually formed. It is this question in particular which is presently under scrutiny, with 





This article states that Mauritania’s foreign-policy strategies (1) try to respond to local 
concerns and reflect the current state of affairs in the country (cf. Marchesin 2010: 21–
22); (2) are closely linked to the country’s definition as an Islamic Republic (and the 
pragmatic use of this label); and, (3) to a large extent, serve the preservation of the 
verticalised social structure known to Mauritania’s majority Hassanophone populations. 
The country’s affiliation with the Arab-Islamic world constitutes another 
important trend in foreign policy—one that can be clearly tracked from the post-
independence period to the present, including political landmarks such as President 
                                                          
28 In November 2016 a group of thirteen activists, declared by Amnesty International as ‘prisoners of 
conscience’, had their sentences significantly reduced by a Mauritanian Appeals Court, which also 





Ould Taya’s decision to incorporate Mauritania in the Union du Maghreb Arabe in 
1989, thus joining Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia in a common political forum, 
and declaring Mauritania’s ‘Maghrebian’ character). Mauritania’s proximity with the 
Arab world constitutes a decisive element in its trajectory since independence, 
influencing everything from its reformist views on Islamic knowledge and practice to its 
overall view of cultural and political expression. The famous ‘trait d’union’ declaration 
by President Ould Daddah in the founding period of independent Mauritania now comes 
into question, as there seems to be a lack of interest in developing deeper bonds with the 
country’s southern neighbours, and a drive in favor of stronger connections with the 
Arab world. 
The arguments presented in this article also seem to confirm the crossing of a 
‘great divide’ between an ‘ulama-centered religious authority (Eickelman and Piscatori, 
1996: 122) and a variety of non-specialised voices when it comes to debates associated 
with Islamic culture and its scholarly readings. Mohamed Mkhaitir’s and Biram’s cases 
affirm the prominence of voices that were until recently disregarded in Mauritania, or 
which were simply incapable of making their opinions accessible to a global audience. 
Actors such as Mohamed Mkhaitir or Biram ould Abeid can now influence state 
policies, and thus challenge a zwaya monopoly on Islamic matters in Mauritania.  
The forms of knowledge transmission now accessible to most Mauritanians 
nurture a questioning of Islamic traditions and their association with the country’s 
particular social landscape. Contrary to what has happened in other North African 
countries, Mauritania’s ‘civil society’ (if this designation can be used in this context) 
has prompted a process of questioning the political and social status quo. The current 
call to alter the social order of Mauritania’s Hassanophone population has been overtly 
counter-argued by the state through a narrative that campaigns—inside the country as 
well as at an international level—for the country’s unbreakable ‘unity’. Only after an 
ongoing contestation of these issues (as well as the resolution of legal procedures, 
notably regarding Mohamed Mkhaitir) will one be capable of clearly measuring the 
success of Mauritania’s ‘weak’, or, following a more common trend, assume the narrow 
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